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Foreword 
A major new element of international negotiations on further reducing SO2 emissions 
is the strive for effect-oriented approaches: environmental susceptibility to pollution 
should determine the extent of required emission reductions. However, there is no 
unique link between exposure levels (such as acid deposition) and emission patterns. 
Atmospheric dispersion processes allow for a wide variety of alternative emission 
reduction schemes to satisfy the same deposition targets. 
Given full information on emission reduction costs, mathematical optimization 
procedures can be applied to determine cost-minimal solutions. Recently it has been 
argued that economic instruments (such as e.g. emission trading systems) are able to 
achieve cost-effective allocations of reduction measures even in the absence of full 
and centralized information. 
An important distinction has to be made between the trading of permits for global 
pollutants (such as C02) and local or regional pollutants (e.g. S02). In contrast to 
global pollutants, reducing the environmental impacts of "local" pollutants depends 
crucially on the location of measures. Therefore, in order to maintain environmental 
quality during the process of emission trading, side conditions have to be established 
for the trading scheme. 
This paper makes a first attempt to explore possible schemes for emission trading, 
taking the regional environmental impacts of pollution into account. 




This paper analyzes the potential role of emission trading systems for non-uniformly 
dispersed air pollutants, for which the geographical location of emissions has a significant 
impact on the location and extent of environmental damage. The paper derives the necessary 
conditions for trading schemes to be cost-effective and introduces the concept of offset rates. 
Offset rates describe the amount of emissions one source has to decrease if another source 
increases its emissions by one unit. 
To explore the potential performance of alternative trading schemes a simulation 
framework based on' the IIASA-RAINS model has been developed. Simulation runs to 
achieve regionally specified maximum levels of sulfur deposition (target loads) in Europe 
show that trading may result in cost savings. The extent to which such cost savings are 
possible and whether the originally specified target deposition levels are exceeded, depends 
crucially on the pre-trade level of emissions, the availability of information on costs, and the 
behaviour of the trading partners. Further analysis is necessary before drawing final 
conclusions. 
Key words: acid rain, sulfur deposition, critical loads, Europe, abatement strategy, cost- 
effectiveness, emission trading, economic instruments 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Currently, negotiations are in progress on a new protocol to control sulfur dioxide 
emissions in Europe. The present protocol calls for all signatories to uniformly reduce their 
SO2 emissions by 30% compared to the year 1980 by 1993. A major new element of the 
current negotiations is the intention to apply an effect-oriented approach by basing the extent 
of emission reductions on the susceptibility of natural ecosystems to acid deposition. As a 
long-term goal, deposition should ultimately be less than so called 'critical loads': the 
maximum exposure levels that can be tolerated by sensitive ecosystems without damage. 
However, a direct conversion of acceptable exposure levels into required emission 
reductions is not possible. The atmospheric dispersion of pollutants permits a wide variety 
of possible combinations of emission levels to achieve the same set of maximum exposure 
levels, such as critical loads. Cost-effectiveness can therefore be introduced as an additional 
principle to determine the allocation of emission reduction efforts. Cost-effectiveness means 
that a given environmental objective is reached at minimum pollution control costs. 
Several approaches can be applied to identify cost-effective emission reduction strategies. In 
the past mathematical optimization procedures have been used to derive cost-minimal 
reduction patterns, assuming full information on the atmospheric dispersion behaviour of 
pollutants and on emission reduction costs is available (e.g. Amann et al., 1991; Derwent, 
1990). 
However, the lack of full information in the real world leads to severe doubts about the 
practical applicability of such optimization approaches. A meeting of designated experts on 
cost effective implementation of the critical loads approach (Norwegian Ministry of the 
Environment, 1991) concluded that in view of the inherent uncertainties in the estimation of 
cost-effective reduction patterns, countries should be given some flexibility to meet their 
commitments. Economic instruments, such as trading emission permits among countries, 
could possibly provide powerful mechanisms to approach cost-effective solutions. An 
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additional argument for emission trading is that emission reduction obligations that will result 
from negotiation might differ from a cost-effective solution since the cost-effective solution 
may not be regarded as a "fair" distribution of costs among countries. 
Over the last few years the use of economic instruments has gained attention as a way to 
meet environmental constraints in cost-effective ways. In particular, their use played a 
prominent role in recent international discussions on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases 
(such as C02) (OECD, 1991). However, there is a fundamental difference between reducing 
such 'global' pollutants and reducing SO2 emissions. Greenhouse gases accumulate globally, 
hence the geographical location of emission reduction measures has minor influence on 
environmental effects. On the other hand, the much shorter residence time of sulfur 
compounds in the atmosphere means that the ecological impacts are influenced not only by 
the volume of emission reduction but also on the geographical location of the reduction 
measures. Although emission trading can keep the total level of emissions constant their 
location will change. As a result, environmental quality (in terms of concentrations or 
depositions) will change. Therefore, emission trading has to adhere to (quite strong) side 
conditions in order to avoid deterioration of environmental quality. 
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The aim of this paper is to give a broad-brush overview of the types of trading 
schemes that have been discussed in the literature. After that, a specific scheme, which 
allows for trading according to a simple offset-rate, is explored. One example of such a rate 
is based on the marginal costs of emission reductions in an optimal solution. This system is 
evaluated on cost-effectiveness and environmental performance, and some aspects of the 
international distribution of costs and environmental impacts are discussed. Further, the 
potential performance of such a trading system is simulated for the exchange of SO2 emission 
permits in order to achieve the target loads for sulfur deposition currently being discussed. 
Section 2 describes some of the basic conditions necessary for emission trading 
schemes to be cost-effective. Section 3 gives an overview of the potential cost-effectiveness 
and environmental impacts of a number of emissions trading schemes that have been 
proposed in the literature and applied in practice. Section 4 introduces the concept of offset 
(exchange) rates and discusses the theoretical merits of such trading systems. Section 5 
develops the method to simulate the process of bilateral, sequential trading of emission 
reduction commitments. Results of some examples (applied to the current European situation) 
are given in Section 6. 
2. COST-EFFECTIVENESS AND TRADING OF PERhllTS 
2.1 The concept of cost-effectiveness 
Whereas the prime objective of environmental policy is the improvement or 
conservation of environmental quality, the achievement of acceptable levels of emissions, 
depositions or ambient concentrations is often used as a more practical operational 
environmental objective. Uniformly dispersed pollutants such as chlorofluorcarbons (CFC) 
or C02 have the same (global) impact on concentrations levels, irrespective of where emitted. 
In this case, controlling the emissions is sufficient to control the ambient concentration levels. 
With non-uniformly dispersed pollutants, such as SO2 or ammonia, deposition or 
concentration levels are not only affected by the amounts emitted but also by the location of 
the sources. This spatial aspect complicates both the design of environmental policy in 
general, and the applicability of emission trading systems in particular. 
2.1.1 Controlling emission levels 
If the objective of environmental policy can be converted to controlling the total amount of 
emissions, the necessary conditions for a cost-effective allocation of emission reductions can 
be derived with the following conceptual framework (Tietenberg, 1985): 
A the total level of emission 
ei the uncontrolled emissions of source i 
Ti the amount of emission reduction by source i 
b the background emission 
A* the desired level of emissions 
Ci(ri) the function which represents the minimum costs of each source of reducing emissions 
with the amount ri 
The total level of emission is the sum of the emissions of all sources (i = 1,. ..,I) plus the 
background emissions (e.g. from other regions or from natural sources): 
Cost-effectiveness occurs if the allocation of emission reductions among the sources is chosen 
such that the costs of reaching the desired level of emission is minimized, subject to the 
condition that the sum of emissions and background emissions is smaller than or equal to the 
desired level of emission: 
subject to 
The most important of the necessary and sufficient (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for an optimum 
solution is the following: 
In Equation (4) L is the Lagrange multiplier or the shadow price, which reflects the change 
in the value of the objective function (in our case the decrease in costs) when the constraint 
on the desired level of emission is relaxed with one unit. 
Equation (4) is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Further conditions are: 
- total emissions should be smaller or equal to the emission target (Equation 3), 
- the emission reductions as well as the Lagrange multipliers have to be non-negative, 
- the sum of the emissions, including the background, has to equal the objective, 
otherwise the Lagrange multiplier is zero. (In this case no emission control would be 
needed to meet the objective.) 
The interpretation of Equation 4 is as follows. In an optimum the marginal costs of 
each source are either equal to L or the source does not have to reduce its emissions (ri is 
zero) I. The important conclusion is that for the optimal solution the marginal costs per ton 
of emission control for each source have to be equal. 
A trading system for emission permits could be designed in the following way: an 
emission permit is defined in terms of an allowable emission rate (e.g. tons SO2) per year. 
A (central) environmental agency, responsible for the overall pollution control policy of a 
region, determines the total amount of issued permits (Q) by taking the emission objective 
The latter can be the case if the marginal costs of reducing the first unit of emissions 
for that specific source are rather high. 
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and subtracting the (expected) background emissions. The permits are then distributed to the 
sources, e.g. according to emission levels in the past ("grandfathering") or through auction. 
It can be shown that under a number of restrictive conditions, trading of such 
emission permits can attain the cost minimum allocation of resources. The conditions are that 
sources minimize their pollution control costs (i.e. the sum of expenses for abatement 
measures and of the net result of trading emission permits), that the permit market is 
competitive and that information or transaction costs are negligible. 
Let's define the following additional elements: 
Q the total amount of issued permits 
Qi the initial permits of source i 
P the price of the permit 
The goal of each individual source is to minimize costs. Costs consist of pollution control 
costs plus the cost of buying additional permits: 
Inin xi=, Ci(r,) +PI(ei-ri) - Q,] 
The cost minimum occurs if marginal costs of emission reductions equal the price of the 
permit. Under perfect market conditions there will be only one price, leading to equal 
marginal costs for all polluters. Note that this is exactly the condition for a cost minimum 
in the formulation before. At the same time, the emission ceiling will be met (if enforcement 
works properly) since no more permits are issued than the total emission objective allows for 
(Equation 3). 
A more intuitive understanding of this cost-minimum can also be given. Figure 1 
shows the marginal costs curves of two sources as a function of the reduced emission 
amount. Drawn in this particular manner, the figure shows all possible combinations of 
emissions after controlling the two sources which leads to a total emission reduction of 20 
units. The allocation of emission reductions that minimizes costs is point D. In this point total 
costs are the surface A+B+C. 
If the initial solution is a uniform reduction (Point E), each source would initially emit 
10 units. With emission trading, Source 1 would buy permits for 5 units and thereby reduce 
its emissions with only 5 units. Source 2 would sell 5 units and thus increase its volume of 
abated emissions to 15. The total cost savings achieved by both sources equals surface D. 
If the market works perfectly, the advantages are plentiful: the cost minimum is 
attained, the emission objective is reached, no centralized information on pollution control 
costs is required, and the permits can be distributed initially in any way that is politically 
acceptable. The agency, however, would have to organize the market. 
Figure 1. Emission trading 
Marginal costs 
Source 2 -> o 5 1 0  15 2 o 
2 o 15 10  5 0 < -  Source 1 
2.1.2 Controlling exposure levels 
When the objective of environmental policy is to attain certain exposure levels (such 
as ambient concentrations or deposition of pollutants), the control problem becomes more 
complicated, in particular if more than one receptor is considered (Bohm and Russel, 1985). 
In such a case, when the location of emission sources is of importance, the conditions 
for an optimum solution are different from the simple emission-oriented approach 
(Tietenberg, 1985). For the conceptual framework the following additional elements are 
defined: 
Dj the level of deposition at receptor j 
the background deposition at receptor j 
D, * the desired level of deposition (the target load) at receptor j 
&j a (linear) transfer coefficient which translates emissions of source i in 
deposition at receptor j 
The deposition at a specific location is a function of the background deposition plus 
the sum of the emissions, multiplied by their transfer coefficients: 
This relation applies to every receptor j (j = 1,. . . ,J). 
The cost-effective solution requires that the total costs of emission reductions are 





b . + l a ( e i - r , )  I i D,' for every j=1, ... ,.J
In addition, the emission reductions have to be non-negative. 
The most relevant of the necessary and sufficient (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for a cost 
minimum are the following (Tietenberg, 1985): 
L, D b ,  a - r  = O 
Equation 10 applies to every receptor (j = 1,. . . ,J). 
Further conditions are: 
- emission reductions and Lagrange multipliers must be non-negative, 
- deposition at each receptor has to be equal or less than the targets (Equation 8), 
- marginal costs per ton of emissions removed have to be equal or higher than the sum 
of the shadow prices for each receptor affected by that source. 
The interpretation is as follows. Equation 9 states that for a cost-effective solution 
either the emission reduction of the source has to be zero (ri=O) or the marginal costs of 
emission reduction for each source have to equal the weighted sum of the shadow prices (L,) 
for each receptor. Weights are the transfer coefficients from source i to each affected 
receptor j. Equation 10 shows that either the required target load @,*) is met exactly or the 
Lj (the shadow price) is zero. The latter means that the receptor is non-binding. The 
important conclusion here is that, generally, for a cost-efficient solution the marginal costs 
per ton emission reduction will be different. 
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A system of transferable permits would in this case require the creation of 'ambient 
permits' or deposition permits. Such permits would allow each polluter to deposit a specific 
amount at certain receptors. Again the task for an agency controlling the trading would be 
relatively easy: For each receptor the target deposition level would be specified (based on 
ecological, political or other considerations). After subtracting background deposition the 
remaining deposition at each receptor would then be distributed as deposition permits to each 
polluter. The only information required would be source-receptor matrices describing the 
atmospheric dispersion of pollutants. For every receptor a separate market would have to be 
- 
established. 
In order to emit one unit each source would have to keep the appropriate number of 
deposition permits (according to the source-receptor matrix) for each receptor it affects. If 
a source wanted to increase emissions it would have to obtain additional deposition permits 
for each of the receptors. 
It has been shown that, in principle, the conditions for a cost-minimum solution also 
satisfy the conditions for a competitive market equilibrium, irrespective of any initial 
distribution of deposition permits (Montgomery, 1972), if sources are cost minimizing agents. 
However, there is less guarantee that the maikets will be competitive than in the emission 
related case: every source has to collect a "portfolio" of deposition permits, which requires 
simultaneous buying in a large number of markets. If the source fails to buy deposition 
permits for only even one receptor, its emissions cannot be increased. This is likely to imply 
high transaction costs and complex trading among more than one buyer and seller. 
Consequently, the number of market participants will be low and a full competitive market 
cannot be expected. 
In conclusion, a system of tradeable deposition permits guarantees achieving 
deposition targets, but high transaction costs will probably reduce the number of profitable 
trades and prevent attainment of the cost minimum solution. Information costs and 
administrative burden are relatively low for the agency although atmospheric transfer 
matrices are necessary to determine the allocation of deposition permits. The administrative 
burden is relatively high for the sources since trading will be complex. 
3. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE TRADING SCHEMES 
3.1 Alternative trading schemes 
In view of the difficulties encountered in establishing a complete set of properly 
functioning markets for deposition permits, several alternatives have been suggested in the 
literature in order to attain deposition targets or ambient standards: 
1. Trading of emission permits within one zone. 
2. Trading of emission permits within several zones. 
3. Single market deposition permit system. 
4. Emission trading subject to trading rules. 
3.1.1 Emission trading in one zone 
The system described in Section 2.1.1 could be established for trading emission 
permits within one zone. Such 'single zone* trading implies that pollution control costs would 
be minimized for (initial) total emissions. However, Bohm and Russel (1985) show that such 
trading systems: 
- would either not meet the deposition targets (if the initial amount of emission permits 
is too high so that after trading targets will be violated at some receptors), 
- or the costs would be higher than the cost minimum (if no conceivable set of trades 
is to violate the standards, initial emissions have to be lowered such that after trading 
standards are not exceeded). 
Clearly, single zone trading cannot be cost-effective since it tends to equalize marginal 
costs, whereas marginal costs generally have to be different if a set of deposition targets is 
the environmental objective. The system could be cheaper or more expensive than uniform 
percent reductions. This depends on the specific regional situation, i.e. the actual transfer 
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coefficients, the cost functions and the levels of unabated emissions of sources (Russel, 
1986). The major advantage is that the system is simple; administrative practicability is high 
and transaction costs will be low. 
3.1.2 Emission trading in several zones 
Trading emission permits among several zones has a certain surface appeal. It offers 
more protection for deposition targets than emission trading in one zone and reduces control 
costs. However, this is only the case if the environmental agency has complete and correct 
knowledge of emission control costs. With limited information, the cost will be higher than 
the cost minimum since emissions cannot be traded among zones. This being so, since 
without knowing the cost-minimum solution, the environmental agency does not know how 
many permits it should allocate to each zone. In addition, there would be no protection 
against violation of the standards even in small zones (Tietenberg, 1985) since it is not 
exactly known where emissions take place after trading. 
3.1.3 Single market deposition permit systems 
Single market deposition permit systems focus on one single "worst case" receptor 
(a 'hot spot'). This type of trading might come very close to the cost minimum. In the 
absence of multiple binding constraints and a stable geographical distribution of emitting 
sources, it also allows for a high degree of control of ambient standards. However, if more 
receptors are binding, trading deposition permits for only one of them is likely to violate the 
deposition standard for the other binding receptors. If the geographical distribution changes, 
other receptors than the single "worst case" receptor may become receptors where the 
deposition targets are violated. Since the focus is on only one receptor it will inevitably 
create an incentive for sources to move to regions where the impact on the hot spot is 
restricted. Consequently, new hot spots will be created undermining the selection of the 
initial "worst-case" receptor (Tietenberg, 1985). 
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3.1.4 Emission trading subject to trading rules 
Three rules for trading subject to rules have appeared in the literature (Atkinson and 
Tietenberg, 1982; Krupnick et al., 1983; McGartland and Oates, 1985; Tietenberg, 1985): 
1. 'Pollution offset' (trading subject to the condition that the deposition targets are not 
violated). 
2. 'Non-degradation offset' (trading subject to non-violation of deposition targets plus 
the fact that total emissions are not allowed to increase). 
3. 'Modified pollution offset' (subject to deposition targets and pre-trade air quality). 
The first rule (pollution offset) appears the most promising, offering the largest 
potential for cost savings with the least binding restrictions. Rule two, the 'non degradation 
rule' comes very close to the US EPA emission trading program of 1986. The third rule, 
'modified pollution offset' prevents deterioration at receptors where pre-trade air quality is 
already better than the standards because neither the deposition targets nor the pre-trade air 
quality are allowed to be violated. These rules do not force sources to trade according to a 
fixed rate e.g. on a one-to-one basis. In principle, the ratio at which sources exchange their 
emission permits is free as long as the ambient standards are not violated. This requires a 
diffusion model which shows that air quality standards are not violated before and after each 
trade. 
Figure 2 shows how these rules would guide trading. There are two receptors R1 and 
R2. The starting point is E. RC is the line that represents the pre-trade (current) air quality 
at receptor 1. The 45 degree line presents the combinations of emissions that hold the 
emissions constant. 
Figure 2. Different trading rules 
Emission source 1 
Emission 
source 2 
If Source 2 is the first source to sell permits (thereby decreasing its own emission), 
under the pollution offset rule the trading possibilities would be within the area A+B+C. 
This is since neither the ambient standard for receptor R1 nor for receptor R2 may be 
violated. So emissions should stay left from the line FG/E2. Under the non-degradation offset 
rule trading possibilities would be limited to A+B, since emissions: 
- are not allowed to increase (should remain left from the 45" line) 
- are not allowed to violate the ambient standards at receptor R1 and R2. 
This limits the trading area to the area left from the line FKElE2. The modified pollution 
offset rule would restrict trading to A only, because neither the pre-trade air quality (RC) nor 
the ambient standards for receptor 1 and 2 may be violated. So trading should take place left 
from the line IE/E2. If Source 2 buys permits (increasing its emissions) the trading area 
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would be limited to area D for all rules, since receptor R2 is then the binding constraint for 
all rules. 
Hence the pollution offset rule offers the largest potential for cost savings since it 
does not make trade contingent on the pre-trade situation of the two sources. Because trading 
can take place in the whole area A+B+C+D, the optimum situation can be attained without 
violating the deposition standards. However, Tietenberg (1985) mentioned that the following 
two effects might occur: 
1) Any actual sequence of trading might be unable to capture the full cost-potential. 
2) For some trades the ratio of emission increases is not adequately defined: some 
sources might be able to increase emissions without compensation ("free riding"). 
Only if simultaneous trading occurs is the system supposed to be fully cost-effective. 
If trading is sequential it would have to be repeated; some trades may even have to be 
reversed in order to achieve the cost-minimum. In general, the fact that trading is bilateral 
rather than simultaneous applies to every trading scheme that tries to take account of 
deposition targets. Bilateral trading does, therefore, restrict the cost-savings we can expect 
from trading (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1991). 
In summary, the offset-rule appears to offer the largest potential for cost- 
effectiveness, followed by the non-degradation offset. All rules guarantee achieving target 
loads. 
All the above trading rules have a drawback to attaining the cost minimum solution: 
trade ratios are not simple, fixed ratios but are contingent on the pre-trade emissions of all 
sources and target loads. A second problem is that after every trade, the possibilities for 
other sources to trade change since, in order to not violate the deposition targets, they depend 
crucially on the emissions of all other sources. Systems taking this aspect into account 
become more complex, at least for the traders, and air quality or dispersion modelling is 
required to evaluate the impact of each trade on the desired deposition levels. In other words, 
the potentially larger gains and the increased certainty that deposition targets will be met has 
a price in the form of higher transaction costs. For the central authority, however, the task 
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is still relatively simple. No knowledge of costs is required. The agency can ask the trading 
partners to run air quality models to prove that deposition levels after the trade are not worse 
than before. 
3.2 Rules for emission trading in the USA 
The emission trading program of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
is strongly based on trading rules, especially on the non-degradation offset rule. This system 
does not allow emissions to increase and national ambient standards may not be violated. 
Within the constant emissions rule, different states are allowed to have their own 
interpretation. Generally, a demonstration of air quality before and after the trade is required. 
The EPA's emissions trading policy statement describes emission trading and sets out 
general principles for evaluating emission trades (Borowsky and Ellis, 1987). The policy 
statement consists of eight parts: covered air pollutants, sources allowed to be traded, ways 
to trade, definition of emission reduction credits, definition of baseline emissions, use of 
credits, air quahty tests and state specific trading rules. All air pollutants for which there are 
national air quality standards (concentrations in the air) can be traded among all existing and 
major new stationary sources. 
The most important trade systems are the 'bubble concept' and the 'offset rule'. 
Bubbles allow existing sources to increase emissions as long as other sources decrease them. 
The offset rule applies to new sources. It allows new or modified sources to use an offset 
(reduction in emissions) from existing sources as long as progress is made in attaining air 
quality standards in non-attainment areas where air quality is worse than the standards. In 
the case of attainment areas air quality standards may not be violated and significant 
deterioration has to be prevented. Emission reduction credits (ERC) are surplus emission 
A recent amendment of the US Clean Air Act, requiring a ten million ton reduction 
in SO2 emissions, will be implemented through a national emission trading system. All of 
the USA is considered one zone. It is based on the premise that given the reduction, 
ecosystems will be protected regardless of which particular sources are controlled to what 
specific degree (Kete, 1991). 
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reductions currently not required by law. They are enforceable, quantifiable and permanent. 
An ERC cannot be used to avoid emission standards for new sources. 
Emission trades for SO2, amongst others, must satisfy an ambient test. Such ambient 
tests check for a non-significant impact of an emission trade on air quality (i.e for SO2 less 
than 1 to 3 microgram so2/m3 as annual average). There are four methods for determining 
ambient equivalence: 
1. Minimis: if emissions are constant and the sum of the increased emissions from the 
increasing source is less than a certain level no air quality test is needed. 
2. Air quality modelling is not required if emissions are constant and sources are located 
within 250 meters. 
3. Limited air quality modelling of only those sources trading is needed if total 
emissions are constant and no significant air quality impact occurs. 
4. Full air quality modelling is needed if there is a net increase in emissions or if the 
trade produces a significant impact on air quality. 
Finally, states may adopt alternate generic trading rules that assure attainment and 
maintenance of air quality standards. 
According to a selective overview by Hahn (1986) some states do, others do 
not (always) require dispersion modelling to demonstrate air quality before and after trading. 
States appear to have interpreted EPA's trading rules to guarantee against exceeding air 
quality standards in three ways: 
1. Requesting offset ratios bigger than one to ensure that overall emissions will be 
reduced (California, Idaho). 
2. Limiting trades to relatively small zones, minimizing the occurrence of hot spots 
(California, New Jersey). 
3. Requiring dispersion modelling (lllinois, Indiana, Virginia, Connecticut). 
Emission trading has been practiced in the USA for more than a decade. There seems 
to be agreement that trading results in (considerable) cost savings and has a neutral to 
positive impact on the environment. However, there also appears to be consensus that trading 
is less cost-effective than economic theory and simulation models would have us believe. 
Creating a market de-novo is not easy: some 80 % of the observed trades have been internal 
(within a firm) rather than external. Several arguments have been given to explain the lower 
than expected cost savings: 
- emission trading is combined with existing regulations (e.g. new sources still require 
reasonable available control technology) thus limiting trading possibilities (Hahn and 
Hester, 1989); 
- statutory provisions restrict trading (e.g. diffusion modelling requirements and 
complicated rules for external trades) (Tietenberg, 1989; Hahn and Hester, 1989); 
- transaction costs are high (searching for trading partners, costs of obtaining approval); 
- uncertainty about the nature of the property rights (i.e. fear of confiscation of created 
rights) restricts supply of emission permits (Hahn'and Hester, 1989); 
- demand for emission permits is limited: old sources already have equipment installed 
or are not pressured too hard, new sources have to meet standards anyway; 
- excess emission reductions are created (and could be sold) but for strategic reasons 
are hoarded for future, internal use (Dwyer, 1991); 
- trading is bilateral and sequential rather than simultaneous so the theoretical cost 
minimum is not attaind (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1991). 
In conclusion, an assessment that aims to give a realistic picture of the potential cost- 
savings of emissions trading has to account for the above elements. Furthermore, in 
developing future trading schemes one should be aware of these elements. 
3.3 Conclusions on emission trading schemes 
Several possibilities for trading permits exist that might, in principle, be used to maintain the 
environmental objective of attaining deposition target levels and still allow emission sources 
sufficient flexibility to save costs (and thereby valuable resources). However, trade-offs are 
involved with every system. 
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Systems that promise large cost savings, in theory, and attainment of the deposition 
targets may be complex for potential traders, which might limit their cost-effectiveness in 
practice. These types of emission trading schemes are: 
- trading of deposition permits, 
- trading subject to trading rules in the form of attaining deposition targets (some of 
them in combination with constant-emissions). 
More simple schemes are at least in theory less cost-effective and although they do 
not give a guarantee that deposition targets are met they require lower transaction costs. 
Hence, more vivid trading and higher cost savings can be expected in practice: 
trading of emission permits within one zone, 
- trading of permits within several zones, 
- trading based on (fixed) offset rates. 
In the United States emission trading is allowed by the new Clean Air Act and the 
EPA Guidelines of 1986 required dispersion modelling and the guarantee that emissions do 
not increase after trading. Several US states have specified their own interpretations to limit 
the probability for "hot spots" such as: offset rates bigger than one, trading in small zones 
and dispersion modelling. The 1990 amendments of the Clean Air Act, however, allow 
emission trading for SO2 in one zone (the USA). 
None of the systems is perfect however, and trade-offs between cost-effectiveness, 
environmental effectiveness (extent to which the environmental objectives, such as deposition 
targets, are met), administrative complexity and political acceptability seem to be 
unavoidable. 
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4. EMKSSION TRADING USING OFFSET RULES (EXCHANGE RATES) 
4.1 The concept of offset rules 
As shown in the previous section, an alternative trading system, which is relatively simple 
and applied in practice, is emission trading subject to an offset rate. An offset rate or 
exchange rate is defined as: 
'the volume of emissions that one source has to decrease if another source increases 
its emissions with one unit'. 
In other words, the exchange rate states that if one source increases emissions by one unit 
(it buys emission permits) another source has to decrease its emissions by the same amount 
multiplied with the exchange rate (it will then sell permits). 
A small model will helps to structure the problem. The following elements are 
defined: 
EOX pre-trade emissions of source x 
EOY pre-trade emissions of source y 
E ~ X  post-trade emissions of source x 
EIY post-trade emissions of source y 
T~ the change of emissions of source x as a result of trading 
TY the change in emissions of source y as a result of trading 
W x ~  the exchange rate (the rate at which y has to decrease emissions if x increases 
emissions with one unit) 
CX&) the function which represents the costs to source x of reducing emissions to 
Ek' 
CY (EU) the function which represents the costs to source y of reducing emissions to 
EY ' 
Both cost functions are represented as functions of the remaining emissions after 
abatement. 
Assuming that both sources want to minimize costs the problem can be stated as 
follows: 
Minimize: Cx(Ex) + Cy(Ey) 
subject to: 
All volumes are non-negative, Wxy is positive. 
The conditions (12) to (14) can be reformulated as one condition by substituting (14) 
in (13). Then we eliminate the traded amounts (T, and T,). After shifting pre-trade amounts 
of emissions to the right hand side, post-trade emissions to the left hand side, and dividing 
by W, we obtain only one condition: 
Using Equations (1 1) and (15) we have the classical problem of programming subject 
to an equality constraint (Intriligator, 1971). The solution to this problem can be found in 
formulating the so called Lagrange function L: 
with L being the Lagrange Multiplier. The conditions for a cost-minimum solution 
(Intriligator, 197 1) are the following: 
in which the suffix ' of the cost functions indicates marginal costs. Conditions (17) and (18) 
can be combined by eliminating L: 
In this case the following situations are possible: 
- If in the pre-trade situation C',(EX) > WxY*C',(Ey), then country x profits by paying 
country y to purify more and itself increase its emissions. 
- If in the pre-trade situation C',(EX) < W,,*C',(E,), then it pays for country x to 
reduce emissions further (hence increase marginal costs) and allow country y to 
increase emissions. 
The condition of Equation 20 can be interpreted as follows: If Wxy = 1, we have the 
classic condition for an optimum stating that marginal costs of both sources have to be equal. 
If Wxy is unequal to one (e.g. Wxy > 1)' and initially the marginal costs of x > Wxy* 
marginal costs of y, then the offset rate implies that source y will have to decrease its 
emissions more than source x is allowed to increase them. Accordingly, it is more difficult 
for source y (it requires more efforts, hence more costs). To compensate for the fact that 
emission increases for source x are smaller than the emission reduction required for source 
y, the marginal costs to source x (in the optimum) have to be Wxy times higher than the 
marginal costs to source y in order to achieve a cost-minimum solution. 
In summary, conditions (19) and (20) are the conditions for an optimum solution to 
the problem of bilateral trading if trading is subject to an exchange rate or offset rate. 
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4.2 Emission trading with an exchange rate equal to the ratio of the marginal costs in the 
optimum 
One possibility for selecting the offset or exchange rate is to base the exchange rate 
on the ratio of the marginal costs in the optimum. This rule can be based on the 
understanding that the ratio of the marginal costs in the optimum depends on the shadow 
prices (relative difficulties) of attaining the binding deposition constraints. It reflects one of 
the conditions for a cost-minimal solution (see Section 2, Equation 9). The ratio of the 
marginal costs (MC1 and MC2) of two sources in the optimum is: 
MC, q=:-l a, ,  L, 
- 
- -  
MC2 q=l a2, L, 
Recall that the L,'s are the Lagrange multipliers (the shadow prices) for the binding 
receptors. They reflect the marginal costs of tightening the constraints. 
To explain how this ratio governs trading we give a simple example with one binding 
receptor and two sources. Let's assume a transfer coefficient from source 1 to the receptor 
of 0.5 and from source 2 to the receptor of 1. The following condition then applies in the 
optimum: 
Therefore we take the ratio of 0.5 as the exchange rate W1,2. This implies that source 
1 would be allowed to increase its emissions with one unit as long as source 2 reduces 
emissions with 0.5 units. 
The advantage of such a rule is that it is simple for the trading sources. However, as 
will be demonstrated later, there is neither a guarantee that the system will attain the cost 
minimum nor is there certainty that deposition targets will not be violated, even if the 
environmental agency has complete and correct knowledge of the costs necessary to 
determine the trading ratio. 
The introduction of such a trade ratio fulfills only one of the several necessary 
conditions, stating that the ratio of marginal costs should be equal to the exchange rates for 
a cost minimum (Section 2, Equation 9). The important condition, that deposition is not 
allowed to exceed target loads (Equation 8), is not a condition for the offset-rate trading. 
This was a choice made in order to first investigate unconstrained trade due to the 
complexities of the trading process of imposing target load constraints. Hence, the solutions 
to both problems are not identical. Mathematically there is no guarantee that the cost 
minimum will be attained by trading nor that the deposition targets will be met. The initial 
emissions of the sources and the trade ratios restrict the possible range of solutions that can 
be reached by trading. 
This can be illustrated graphically. The y-axis of Figure 3 shows the emissions of 
source 2 and the x-axis emissions of source 1. The lines R1 and R2 are combinations of 
emissions from both sources for which the deposition targets at Receptors 1 and 2 are met 
with equality, assuming (constant) emissions from all other sources. The curves C1, C2 and 
C3 are iso-cost curves: they sKow combinations of emissions from both sources which lead 
to the same level of total costs. The closer these costs are to the origin, the higher the costs 
and lower the emissions are. The Figure shows that as long as emissions from both sources 
remain within the area OAEB the deposition targets are met. The least-cost solution is point 
E. At this point the ratio of the marginal costs equals the weighted ratio of their transfer 
coefficients for Receptors 2 and 1, which at this point are both binding. This ratio is also the 
coefficient that determines the direction of line R3 (weighted between R2 and Rl). This 
implies that an exchange rate based on the ratio of the optimal marginal costs allows both 
sources to trade as long as they move (trade) along a line parallel to the line R3. We see now 
that whether the optimum (E) is attained or not depends on the initial solution. If the initial 
position is P, the trading ratio prevents attaining the optimum, although cost savings are 
possible. Starting from P, sources would only be allowed to trade along the dotted line R3' 
barallel to R3). In this case, E' would be the least cost solution attainable from P with the 
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given trade ratio. Obviously E' is not identical with E, and therefore costs (C2) are higher 
than in the real optimum (Cl). 
The question arises if trading according to an exchange rate equal to the marginal 
costs in the optimum can lead to exceedance of the deposition targets. The answer is that this 
might happen, depending on the configuration of the cost functions, for two reasons: 
1. Although the configuration of cost functions is likely to move countries from any 
initial solution into the interior of the feasible region, there is no guarantee that 
trading stops inside the feasible region (AEBO). 
2. The exchange rate steering the bilateral trades is based on the optimum solution for 
all cost functions of all countries, whereas the bilateral trade optimum is based on a 
cost-minimum solution based on the cost functions for the two trading countries only. 
Regarding the first reason, Figure 3 shows that for that specific configuration of cost 
functions source 2 will decrease emissions and we move into the interior of the feasible 
region up to point E'. Given the iso cost curves it is not possible that we move from P' out 
of the feasible region to D, since this would increase costs (iso cost curve would be closer 
to the origin). However, depending on the specific configuration of cost curves and the 
starting point it is conceivable that we move into the interior but do not remain inside. In this 
case trading could bring us to point D, outside the feasible region. 
The second reason implies that the iso cost curves for the two trading countries are 
not the same as the iso cost curves for all countries. Consequently, the iso cost curves for 
the two countries (C2 and Cf) are not necessarily parallel to the iso cost curve (C1) for all 
countries. So in this case the cost-minimum solution for the two countries might be in or 
outside the feasible region. 
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Figure 3. Trading with an exchange rate. 
Emission source 1 
Emission 
source 2 
In summary, whether or not the proposed exchange rate brings the optimum depends 
on the initial solution, even if the costs are known exactly. 
If an environmental agency has incorrect information on costs, it is likely that neither 
the cost-minimum nor the deposition targets will be attained. Sources will trade on the basis 
of their costs, but the exchange rates would be based on the environmental agency's (wrong) 
perception of the costs. For illustration assume that the 'real' optimum (based on the 'true' 
cost curves C1 and C2) is Point P (Figure 4). From any starting point trading could only 
move parallel to R3, since this direction (reflecting the ratios of the marginal costs as they 
have been assumed by the agency, based on incorrect information on the costs C') is 
determined as the trade ratio. If we take e.g. E as a starting point, trading would follow the 
line R3. In this case trading will move us from Point E to Point P', outside the feasible area, 
since at that point iso cost curves are further away from the origin and costs for both sources 
are lower. 
Figure 4. Incorrect information on costs 
Emission source 1 
source 2 
Although there is evidence that the optimum solution could be achieved by chance, 
the question remains of how close such a trading scheme could approach the optimum. 
Unfortunately, an analytical solution is rather difficult to develop and the magnitude depends 
crucially on the actual problem specification (transfer coefficients, target loads, cost curves, 
initial solutions). Therefore, the following section describes a simulation of such trading 
processes and their application to reducing the long-range transport of sulfur compounds in 
Europe. 
5. THE TRADE SIMULATION: METHOD Ah?) DATA 
5.1 Introduction 
This section describes the method (algorithm) developed to simulate bilateral, 
sequential trading using trade ratios as introduced above. In addition, data on the costs and 
transfer coefficients used for the example simulation runs are briefly summarized. 
The algorithm makes use of an adapted version of the optimization module in the 
RAINS (Regional Acidification INformation and Simulation) model (Alcamo et al., 1990). 
This model simulates the flow of acidifying pollutants (sulfur and nitrogen species) from 
source regions in Europe to environmental receptors. The current model (version 6.0) covers 
38 source regions in Europe: 26 countries, 7 regions in the former USSR and 5 sea regions 
(ship emissions). Analysis of deposition is performed for 547 land-based receptor sites with 
a regular grid size of 150*150 km. 
5.2 The optimization approach implemented in the RAINS model 
The optimization mode of the RAINS model allows the user: 
1. to identify the cost-minimal international allocation emission reduction measures to 
attain a set of deposition levels for each receptor site in Europe; 
2. to determine the lowest costs to attain a target level of total European emissions. 
The optimization modules formulate possible strategies to minimize the costs of 
achieving deposition targets at certain receptors as a linear optimization problem that can be 
solved with LP packages (Batterman and Amann, 1991). The cost-effective solution requires 
that the total costs of emission reductions are minimized, subject to the constraint that the 
desired depositions are met at every receptor: 
Min C = Ei El C;/ R,, 
Rip, is the emission reduction in region i at the 1 th level. Cost functions of emission 
reductions are expressed as piecewise linear curves denoting cost-minimal combination of 
measures within each country to achieve certain levels of national total emissions. C'i,l are 
the marginal costs, determined as the slope of the cost curve in region i at level 1. The 
reduction in each of the segments is limited: 
0 s R, s R,,,, for i=1 ,  ..., 38 s= l , . . , .  S 
An identity relates emission reductions with unabated emissions &) to calculate emissions 
remaining after abatement: 
E, = - Es R, for 1.1 ,..., 38 
Total deposition (wet and dry) at each receptor j is calculated as the sum of the contributions 
of each source region plus the background deposition: 
D, = Xi ad Ei + b, for j=1, ...J 
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with qj being the linear source-receptor relationship from region i to receptor j, as based on 
the atmospheric transport model. bj is the background deposition which is not attributable to 
specific sources and considered as not reducible. 
Furthermore, limits or targets can be set on the sulfur deposition for each receptor 
j Q=1, ..., J): 
Alternatively, so called policy constraints can be added on the maximum or minimum 
emissions remaining after abatement in each Region i to reflect e.g. abatement devices 
already in place: 
The above equations form a large LP model that requires a significant amount of 
computer, resources. Sever* algorithms have therefore been developed to speed 
computations, as well as allowing for rapid and interactive use of the model on a personal 
computer. First, each regional cost function is reduced to a maximum of eight segments. 
Region specific curves for SO2 reduction may consist of up to 53 segments (Amann and 
Kornai, 1987). Smaller segments are merged in such a way that the deviation from the 
original curve remains below 2%. Secondly, the problem is reformulated so that initially 
emissions are fully abated so that emissions are reduced to the lowest technically feasible 
level. This implies that it is immediately lcnown whether deposition targets are feasible. If 
targets are feasible, then emissions are increased in the LP program in order to maximize 
cost savings from the fully abated case. As a result many LP iterations are eliminated. 
Thirdly, results of previous optimization with similar characteristics are employed. Finally, 
filters are used to identify those receptors that may actually constrain the optimization. Other 
receptors, typically the majority, can be removed without affecting the solution. 
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If the objective is the attainment of a certain level of Europe-wide emissions the 
optimization problem is simpler: 
Min C = Xi C;l*Ri, 
subject to the condition: 
Again, the reductions in each of the segments 1 are limited to the technically feasible 
reductions. The solution to the problem is relatively easy. The segments of all the regional 
cost curves are ranked according to increasing marginal costs to form the so-called 
continental cost function. The associated emission reductions of each of the segments are 
added and subtracted from the unabated emissions. What remains are the total European-wide 
emissions after abatement. The cost minimum is easily determined since the point is sought 
where the emissions remaining after abatement equal the desired target. 
5.3 The method to simulate bilateral trading 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Until recently, many model studies simply assumed that the potential cost savings of 
emission trading schemes would equal the results of optimization procedures; in other words, 
a perfectly working market where emission permits are simultaneously traded was assumed. 
Practice, as well as recent model studies (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1991), show that in 
reality trading takes place bilaterally and sequentially. With such restrictions, trading is not 
expected to capture the complete cost savings possible according to any LP cost minimization 
procedure. The trading algorithm simulated here describes a process of repeated bilateral 
trading subject to an offset or exchange rate for every possible combination of bilateral 
trades. New elements are: the user can specify any offset rate including those that are 
unequal to one, the model allows for calculation of transaction costs and permits the setting 
of thresholds (based on perceived transaction costs) below which trades do not take place. 
Figure 5 depicts a flow diagram of the trading algorithm. The diagram shows that the 
procedure consists of the following steps: 
1. Creation of a matrix of potential cost savings from each potential bilateral trade. 
2. Calculation of transaction costs and determination of threshold level, below which 
trades will not take place. 
3. Selection of the trading sequence. 
4.  Updating of emissions after consummation of the selected trade and recording cost 
savings. 
5 .  Updating of the matrix of possible trades, accounting for the trades that took place 
I (return to step 1). 
Figure 5. Flow diagram of bilateral trading 
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5.3.2 Creation of the cost saving matrix 
As discussed above, cost functions estimated with the RAINS model are piece-wise 
linear. As a result, RAINS does not work by equalizing marginal costs but sorts and ranks 
elements of two (or more) cost functions according to their marginal costs (in ascending 
order). If a trade ratio is introduced, the determination of the cost-optimal bilateral 
combination of emission reductions can be performed in a similar way, taking into account 
the trade ratio. This implies the following modifications in the cost curves for the source y, 
the source decreasing emissions after trade: 
1. The marginal costs of source y are multiplied with the exchange rate (reflects 
Condition 20). 
2. The emissions of source y (after abatement) are divided by the exchange rate (reflects 
Condition 19). This consists of two elements: 
- dividing the unabated emissions, 
- dividing the volumes of emissions abated by each measure. 
3. The segments of the cost functions of source x (the original one) are merged with the 
modified segments of source y and are ranked according to their (partly modified) 
marginal costs. 
4.  The pre-trade level of emissions of source y is divided by the exchange rate 
(Condition 20) in order to find the optimum emission levels with the exchange rate. 
5. The point is determined where the (modified) emissions of this combined (modified) 
cost function (left hand side of Equation 19) are equal to the modified pre-trade 
emissions (right hand side of Equation 19). This is the cost-minimum solution for the 
bilateral trade. 
6. The outcome of step 5 is compared with the costs of controlling emissions to the pre- 
trade emission levels using the original cost functions, and the cost savings are noted. 
7. The procedure is repeated for every combination of bilateral trades until a matrix of 
cost savings of all possible trades is created. 
5.3.3 Transaction costs 
An evaluation of emission trading practices in the USA showed that transactions costs 
are frequently prohibitive to trading. In the literature, transactions costs are estimated at 10- 
30% of the costs savings (Dwyer, 1991). Building in transaction costs (Step 2 in Figure 5) 
thus gives a more realistic picture of the potential cost savings. The algorithm consists of the 
following steps: 
1. Specify the level of transaction costs for each trade exogenously. 
2. Specify a threshold level of (expected) transaction costs. If cost savings of a potential 
bilateral trade are below the threshold the trade is not profitable and will be skipped 
from further selection. 
5.3.4 Selection of trades 
After calculating the matrix of cost savings of all possible (and profitable) trades the 
sequence of trading is determined. Currently, the algorithm ranks all possible trades 
according to their cost savings and selects the one with the highest cost savings. Cost savings 
, are defined as the difference between the totzil cost increase of the emission permit selling 
sources and the total cost decrease of the emission increasing source, between the pre-trade 
emission level (of every round) and the post-trade emission level. This is an optimistic 
assumption assuming perfect information and coordination of the selection of traders. An 
alternative (pessimistic) assumption, currently not implemented, would be that due to the 
imperfect information of traders, and due to the competition to get the trade accepted that is 
best for two individual trade partners and not necessarily the best in terms of highest overall 
cost savings, the selection of trade takes place at random. 
5.3.5 Updating the emission matrix and the matrix of possible trades 
Upon completion of the trade(s), the following steps are implemented: 
1. Update the @re-trade) emission vector, accounting for the trade(s) that took place. 
2. Record the cost savings of the trade (compared to the pre-trade situation) in a file. 
As a final step the matrix of possible trades is updated. Sources that have already 
traded are allowed to trade again, but not with the same partner: the cells of the cost-savings 
matrix corresponding to the trade between the two regions concluding the trade are skipped, 
and the cost savings of all the other trade relationships of these two countries are recalculated 
with the new emission levels. 
5.4 Data on costs and atmospheric transport 
The RAINS model contains a sub-module to assess the potential and costs for 
alternative emission abatement technologies. The evaluation is based on internationally 
reported performance and cost data of control devices (Amann and Kornai, 1987). Cost 
estimates for specific technologies are extrapolated by the model to reflect country-specific 
conditions such as operating hours, boiler size, and fuel price. In the current version of the 
model the cost evaluation of the emission reduction techniques is limited to the most relevant 
measures that have no impact on the underlying pattern of energy use. For the time being, 
energy conservation and fuel substitution are excluded from the analysis. The following 
technical options are implemented: 
1. Use of low sulfur fuels and fuel desulfurization: 
This pertains to the use of fuels with a reduced sulfur content, such as fuels with a 
lower natural sulfur content or fuels that have undergone a desulfurization process. 
For low sulfur hard coal, the sulfur content is set at 1 %. Desulfurization of gas oil 
and diesel oil can reduce the sulfur content in two steps: up to 0.3% and up to 
0.15 %. The desulfurization of heavy fuel oil is assumed to be possible up to a level 
of 1%.  
2. Desulfurization of flue gases during or after combustion: 
This set of measures requires investments at the plant site. Three techniques are 
considered: desulfurization during combustion with removal efficiencies of 50% at 
relatively low costs, flue gas desulfurization with a removal efficiency of 95% at 
moderate costs, and the use of advanced flue gas purification with emission reduction 
of 98% at high costs. 
Not all abatement technologies are applicable for all fuel types and energy sectors (see 
Amann and Kornai, 1987). Moreover, a distinction is made between new and existing plants 
to account for the additional costs of retrofitting existing plants. 
For the optimization mode RAINS creates 'national cost functions' for controlling 
emissions. National circumstances (such as sulfur content and operating hours) result in 
variations in the costs for applying the same technology in different countries in Europe. 
Another difference is the structural variations of energy systems, especially in the amount 
and structure of energy use, which determines the potential for application of individual 
control options. One way to combine these factors is to compile national cost functions. 
These functions display the lowest costs for achieving various emission levels by applying 
the cost optimal combination of abatement options. This is done by ranking the options 
according to their marginal costs and their individual potential for removal and can be 
performed within each fuel category. The cost curves used in this paper are based on official 
energy use projections for the year 2000 (Latest Energy Pathways) as published by the 
International Energy Agency PEA, 199 1). 
Source-receptor transfer coefficients, which relate (country) emissions in the diffusion 
model to deposition at receptor points (for each grid), are based on the acid deposition model 
developed within the European Monitoring and Evaluation Program (EMEP) (Iversen et al., 
1991). The model includes ten different chemical components in the air, three of which are 
man-made: SO,, NO, and NH3. Input data for the model consist of emissions for the three 
pollutants and meteorological data such as precipitation, wind speed and temperature. 
Meteorological data are taken from a weather prediction model and direct observations. As 
far as possible emission data employed are official data submitted by the different countries. 
The model calculates transboundary fluxes of oxidized sulphur and nitrogen as well as 
reduced nitrogen (ammonia and its product ammonium). For the trade simulations presented 
in this paper, EMEP model results have been applied that reflect the meteorological average 
of the years 1985, 1987 to 1990. 
6. RESULTS OF THE TRADE SIMULATION 
6.1 Scenario setting 
Current negotiations on the new sulfur Protocol focus on a set of sulfur deposition 
targets. Provisional (interim) deposition targets are available for ten countries. Because of 
the considerable emissions reductions implied by these proposed targets, recent discussion 
focused on the original target loads being increased uniformly by 10, 20, 30 or 40%. For the 
purpose of this study targets loads (as of December 1991), uniformly increased by 40%, have 
been selected as the reference targets (see Figure 6). 
This section examines the cost-effectiveness, environmental impacts and distributive 
consequences of the following instruments (or scenarios) for achieving the target loads: 
1. a cost-minimum allocation of measures (based on optimization); 
2. a uniform percentage reduction for all countries; 
3. emission trading with an offset rate of one; and 
4. emission trading with an offset rate equal to the marginal costs in the optimum. 
The allocation of reductions in Scenario 2 is steered by one 'binding' receptor in the 
United Kingdom. To meet the target load of this receptor, emissions have to be reduced by 
84% in some countries. To create a 'flat-rate' scenario, this 84% reduction was applied to 
all other countries, where technically feasible. In those cases where such a reduction was not 
considered achievable by the measures implemented in the RAINS model, the maximum 
technically feasible reductions were assumed. Since the extent of emission reduction is mainly 
steered by the 'flat-rate' criterion, emission reductions in most countries are much higher 
than necessary to maintain target loads. Consequently, deposition is well below target loads 
at almost all receptor sites in Europe. 
Both emission trading schemes (Scenarios 3 and 4) simulate bilateral, sequential 
trading. The trading scheme with an offset rate of one allows the exchange of emission 
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reduction commitments on a one-to-one basis. Consequently, emissions are constant. The 
second scheme has a different ratio for each particular trade. 
In principle, emission trading can start from any initial distribution of emission 
reduction commitments. In this example, both emission trading schemes start from the 84% 
emission reduction target of Scenario 2. This has the advantage that initially the target loads 
are not violated and, therefore, it allows to analyze whether or not emission trading results 
in violation of the targets. The trading simulation further assumes that emissions from sea 
regions (resulting from ships) are not allowed to be traded since there is no central authority 
who could act as a trading partner. 
Figure 6. Target loads used in this paper (g ~ / r n ~ / ~ r )  
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6.2 Cost-effectiveness and environmental impacts of emission trading scenarios 
Table 1 displays the major results of the various scenarios in terms of their emission 
control costs, the total remaining emissions, the overall exceedance of target loads and 
exceedance of the (5 percentile) critical loads. The Table shows that Scenario 1 (optimized 
allocation) is the most cost-effective means to achieve the target loads. Costs of uniform per 
cent reduction (Scenario 2) are twice as high as in Scenario 1. Starting from Scenario 2, both 
emission trading schemes result in cost savings over the uniform reduction. However, trading 
on a one-to-one basis (Scenario 3) reduces costs by 16% (10 milliard DMIyear), whereas 
trading using the exchange rates (based on the ratios of the marginal costs, Scenario 4) leads 
to cost savings of 30% over the uniform cut-back (Scenario 2) but does not attain the cost 
minimum (Scenario 1). At the same time, environmental impacts are different for each 
scenario. Target loads are not violated, per definition, in Scenarios 1 and 2, and by keeping 
the very low initial level of emissions constant, one-to-one trading also does not result in 
exceeding target loads (at least in this particular case). The cost savings of Scenario 4 
(exchange rate trading) are obtained by a substantial increase in emissions. Still this increase 
does not result in exceedance of target loads after trading due to the very low pre-trade level 
of emissions. 
Table 1 also shows that emissions remaining after the uniform cut-back (Scenario 2) 
are much lower than in Scenario 1 (cost minimum). Due to the flat rate requirement, 
emissions also have to be reduced in places where it is not necessary to meet the deposition 
targets. Since Scenario 2 is taken as the starting point for trading, Scenario 3 (one-to-one 
trading) keeps the total European emissions constant at this level, but achieves cost savings 
by equalizing marginal costs for all emitters. Since the very low pre-trade emissions result 
in a strong overfulfillment of the target loads, the rearrangement of reduction measures 
introduced by emission trading does, in this case, not violate target loads. 
The exchange rate trading (Scenario 4) results in a considerable increase in 
emissions, from 11760 kt to 19727 kt. Consequently, costs are much lower than with the 
uniform cut-back. In spite of this increase in emissions, target loads are not violated. Again, 
this is due to the fact that initial @re-trade) emissions are very low. Consequently, deposition 
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at all but one of the receptors is much lower than the target loads. Hence, if trading starts 
from this very low initial level, deposition at most receptors can be raised without exceeding 
the target loads. 
Table 1: Comparison of scenario results 
Although target loads are not exceeded in any scenario, environmental impacts are 
different. Table 1 shows that a uniform cutback results in a smaller area (10%) being affected 
by deposition exceeding critical loads than in the optimized Scenario 1 (23%). This means 
that higher costs also result in higher environmental benefits, although marginal benefits 
decrease (costs are twice as high as in the cost minimum scenario but the area with 
deposition above critical loads only increases from 77% to 90%). Similar to Scenario 2, an 
exceedance of critical loads (10 % of land area) is also expected to result from one-to-one 
emission trading (Scenario 3), though at different locations and at lower costs. Trading 
subject to exchange rates (Scenario 4) leads to an exceedance of critical loads in 12.6% of 
the land area. 
Annual costs (Mio 
DM) 
Annual costs (as % of 
uniform cutback) 
Emissions (kt SO2) 
Exceedance of critical 



































6.3 A closer look at the trading results 
6.3.1 One-to-one trading (Scenario 3) 
Under one-to-one trading, countries are allowed to trade their emission reduction 
commitments as long as total emissions remain constant. An increase in emissions by one 
country has to be offset by a decrease of the same amount in another country. 
Table 2 shows the trades and sequence of trading that would result from one-to-one 
trading. Thirty trades are expected to be implemented, and the total cost saving of all trades 
amounts to 10.5 milliard DMIyear. Nearly 90% of the cost saving is achieved by the first 
ten trades. 
The first trade takes place between Turkey and FRG-E (former GDR). As Table 3 
shows this is between the country with the highest marginal costs of the initial solution 
(Turkey) and one of the countries with the lowest marginal costs (FRG-E). Because of its 
high marginal costs Turkey buys permits and increases emissions by 254 kiloton SO2. With 
an offset rate of one, FRG-E has to reduce emissions with the same amount. The total cost 
savings (decrease in pollution control costs of Turkey minus the additional costs for FRG-E) 
amount to nearly 2.4 milliard DMIyear. 
Table 3 shows that one-to-one trading tries to equalize marginal costs. Whereas marginal 
costs vary between 478574 and 849 DMIton SO2 before trading, the differences in marginal 
costs, after all trades are implemented, range between 4797 and 788 DMIton SO2. 
Table 4 shows the remaining emissions and the pollution control costs (without 
transfer payments) that result after trading. The Table shows that the total amount of 
emissions is constant (11760 kilotons SO2) before and after the trade. Although trading 
reduces total pollution control costs from 63.8 milliard DMIyear to 53.3 milliard DMIyear, 
the pollution control costs are still much higher than the cost minimum (31.2 milliard 
DMlyear) of Scenario 1. 
Table 2. Trades implemented with the one-to-one trading 
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Table 3. Marginal costs of one-to-one trading (DMIton SO2) 










































































































































6.3.2 Exchange rate trading (Scenario 4) 
Whereas in Scenario 3 a uniform offset rate of one was selected, this example 
explores the scope for non-uniform offset rates. Since offset rates are instruments to 
determine the profitability and thereby the economic potential for individual trades, a 
selection of appropriate rates could steer the trading process into certain desired directions. 
As outlined in the introductory section of this paper there are doubts about the 
practical applicability of optimization approaches to allocate international emission reduction 
requirements. It has been argued that, as an alternative, properly designed emission trading 
schemes could possibly achieve the cost optimal solution without centralized information on 
emission control costs. 
To steer the trading process into this direction, one of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for 
the cost minimum (Equation 9 in Section 2) is used to determine the offset rate of emission 
trading between two countries. Thereby, the offset rate (Wxy) is set equal to the ratio of the 
marginal costs of emission reductions in the optimum (MCi): 
Wxy = MCllMC2 
For example, marginal costs of country i of 2000 Dhllt S 4  and of country j of 1000 Dhllt 
SO2 result in an offset rate of 2: 
This implies that if source 1 increases emissions with one unit, source 2 can reduce its 
emissions with 2 units. Since marginal costs in the optimum generally differ among 
countries, the offset rates for the bilateral trades will also be different for each trade 
combination. 
Costs of emission reductions can be described in several ways. Whereas some theoretical 
economic analyses assume continuous cost curves, other more technologically oriented 
approaches use piecewise linear cost curves. It is, however, in the nature of linear 
optimization that the optimal status of most variables of an optimization problem will lie 
exactly at the comer points of the solution space, i.e. on the intersections of the linear cost 
function segments. For these points, however, a unique definition of marginal costs does not 
exist. 
The marginal costs for increasing emission reductions are different to the marginal 
costs for decreasing emission reductions. Since the proposed rule for deriving offset rates is 
not well defined for these situations, this simulation uses the higher marginal costs (i.e. the 
additional costs of further reducing emissions (represented by the next 'step of the cost curve) 
I 
by default. This assumption also avoids problems occumng with marginal costs of zero, for 
which the definition of the offset rate according to Equation 9 is not applicable (MCj = 0). 
Table 5 shows the trades that are expected to be implemented for this scenario. The 
offset rate differs among the implemented trades between 0.03 (Trade 6) and 11.12 (Trade 
21). 
The first trade takes place between Turkey and France. Due to Turkey's rapid 
economic development, the marginal costs of the pre-trade initial status, i.e. the 84% 
emission reduction (compared to 1980), are extremely high. The optimal solution, however, 
does not prescribe any emission reductions for Turkey since Turkey's emissions do not 
deposit on those areas for which target loads have been specified. Consequently, the marginal 
costs of the optimal solution are very low. The resulting exchange rate with France of 0.08 
(i.e. French marginal costs of the optimum are only 8% of the marginal costs in Turkey) 
allows Turkey to increase its emissions by 1912 kt up to the unabated level (i.e. 3254 kt of 
SO2), whereas France would reduce its emissions by 1912 * 0.075 = 144 kt. This saves 
Turkey abatement costs of 5.0 milliard DMIyr, while costs in France increase with 622 
million DMlyr. The net cost savings of this trade are 4.4 milliard DMlyr. 
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After consummating the first trade, pre-trade emissions change and the potential cost 
savings of all remaining bilateral trades with either France or Turkey involved are calculated 
again. The trade with the highest cost saving is implemented. This procedure is repeated until 
no trade with cost savings above a certain threshold (in the example 0.1 million DMIyear) 
is left. 
Table 5 shows that 35 trades will be implemented under the exchange rate regime. 
The total cost savings per year would amount to 19.0 milliard DMIyear. The gains from the 
first ten trades add up to nearly 90% of the total cost savings. As can be seen, a number of 
countries (e.g. Turkey, France, Remaining part of the former USSR, Poland, Kola Peninsula) 
would trade with several partners. 
, I  The extent to which exchange rate trading is able to approach the cost-minimum 
solution can be seen from combining Table 6 and Table 7. Table 6 indicates that 22 countries 
(out of 33) have marginal costs that are equal to the marginal costs in the optimum. This 
implies that trades between these 22 countries does not result in cost savings since their 
marginal cost ratio equals the exchange rate. The results further suggest that of the other 
trades still possible the cost savings are smaller than the threshold of 0.1 million DMIyear. 
Although 22 countries have marginal costs equal to the optimum marginal costs, only 
six countries (Belgium, Hungary, Luxembourg, Rumania, Ukraine and Moldavia) actually 
reach the same emission levels, i.e. they end up in a different part of the same segment of 
the cost curve. An example is France where the optimum (402 kt SO2) .is the upper end, and 
the pre-trade emissions (253 kt SO2) is the lower end of the same segment (of 9506 DMIton 
SO2) of the cost curve. 
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Table 6. Marginal costs of exchange rate trading @M/ton SO2) 
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Table 7 also shows that emissions will increase after trading from 11760 to 19727 kt. 
The emissions are still lower than necessary (26654 kt SO2) to meet the cost minimum. As 
a result pollution control costs, although below the initial level of 63.7 milliard DMIyear, 
are (with 44.6 milliard DMIyear) still above the cost minimum. 
Several reasons are responsible for the non-attainment of the optimal solution: 
- The offset rate is based only on one condition for the optimum solution. Others, 
which have influence on the optimum status, are ignored. 
- The concept of marginal costs is not well defined and ambiguous for piecewise linear 
cost curves. In the optimum solution the stepwise cost function allows for two optimal 
marginal costs. The exchange rate, however, is only based on one of them. 
- Not all emitters are included in the trading scheme. As mentioned before, emissions 
from sea transport are excluded from trading because of the lack of trading agents. 
Although this reason is of minor importance in this example, non-participation of 




6.4 The sensitivity of the trade simulations 
6.4.1 Introduction 
The results discussed above depend on the specific situation assumed for these 
scenarios and they may be sensitive to changes in: 
- pre-trade emission levels, 
- transaction costs, 
- availability of information to the traders (perfect or imperfect) on the potential cost 
savings of each trade, 
- information on cost functions available to the environmental agency determining the 
exchange rate or offset-rates, 
- assumptions made on the behavior of the trading partners. / 
6.4.2 Changes in pre-trade emissions and transaction costs 
Table 8 explores the sensitivities introduced by the first two items by analyzing a 
different starting point (i.e. starting from the optimum solution instead of the uniform 84% 
reduction), and by including transaction costs on the performance of emission trading with 
an exchange rate. It can be seen (compare with Table 1, cost minimum) that if exchange-rate 
trading started from the optimum it would stay close to the optimum. Two trades take place 
that only marginally change emissions. The first trade allows Turkey to reduce emissions and 
the Baltic region to increase. These trades are caused by the definition problem of marginal 
costs in the optimum mentioned before. The traded amounts, however, are limited. As a 
result cost savings are very small and the target loads are not exceeded. 
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Table 8. Sensitivity of exchange rate trading 
The second example analyzes the potential influence of non-zero transaction costs 
(costs of finding a trading partner, agreeing upon a trade, getting a trade accepted). An 
assumed level of 50 million DMIyear per trade would reduce the number of profitable trades 
to 19 (instead of 35). The pollution control costs would not differ significantly from the 
reference scenario, but the distribution of emissions would change considerably (a number 
of trades would not take place). Still, the target loads are not violated. This is due to the fact 
that initial emissions are very low, oversatisfying targets at most receptors. It can be 










An item for further analysis is the extent to which target loads are exceeded if one 
starts from higher initial emissions than the 84% flat rate reduction. In this case initial 
depositions are closer to their target, increasing the chance of exceedance. 
Although exchange rate trading does not result in exceedance of target loads, at least 
not in the examples shown, simple one-to-one trading does if one starts from the optimum 
emission level (see   able 9). Although overall European emissions are kept at the same level 
as before, their geographical distribution differs, resulting now in exceedance of target loads 
in 2% to 95% of the land area of those countries that submitted target loads. Since one-to- 





















73% of initial solution). However, this cost decline is not a real saving because 
environmental impacts are different. 
Including transaction costs again does not influence results significantly. Annual costs 
are slightly higher than in the reference case. As before, the distribution of emissions differs 
from the reference case, and the fact that (the low initial) level of emissions is constant 
prevents violation of target loads. 
Table 9. Sensitivity of one-to-one trading 
SCENARIO: 
RESULTS: 
Annual costs (Mio DM) 
Annual costs (as % of 
cost minimum) 
Emissions (kt SO,) 
Exceedance of target 







6.4.3 Other assumptions 
Three other assumptions desewe qualitative discussion. First, the algorithm assumes 
perfect information: trades are implemented in descending order of their cost-savings. 
Assuming imperfect informatior. (random trading) would probably result in considerably 
lower cost savings than in the first case (see Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1991). This requires 
further analysis. 
Second, to set the exchange rate it is assumed that the environmental agency has 
perfect information about abatement costs when determining the optimal solution. It appears 
more realistic however to assume that this information is less than perfect, not least because 
cost functions depend crucially on the underlying prediction of future energy consumption. 
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Although the energy scenario used is based on the latest available information and has been 
partly reviewed by parties to the UNIECE convention, considerable uncertainty on Europe's 
energy future still remains. 
Consequently, if the agency sets exchange rates on centrally perceived cost curves it 
might well be that countries trade on the basis of what they individually see as realistic cost 
functions. The results of emission trading will therefore differ from the expectations of the 
agency. As a result, the emission pattern determining environmental impacts will also be 
uncertain. One should, however, realize that this uncertainty on environmental impacts is 
connected to every strategy that is unable to fix total emission ceilings in each European 
country. 
Third, given initial emission and exchange rates, it is assumed that trading partners 
will try to minimize costs. Although this is a realistic assumption for firms operating on a 
competitive market, it is doubtful whether this is an adequate assumption for the behavior 
of countries in an international context (Kremeniouk, 1991). Countries might well place more 
emphasis on their environmental targets than on cost-effectiveness. Moreover, aspects of 
administrative practicality as well as political considerations are likely to play an important 
role (compare Opschoor and Vos, 1989). 
6.5 Distribution of costs after emission trading 
Not only are the overall European environmental impacts relevant, but also their 
regional distribution. One of the favorable aspects of emission trading is that it allows for a 
redistribution of costs such that every country is better off in the sense of having lower costs. 
In this context costs consist of pollution control costs plus transfers made between countries 
that agree on a trade. If a trade takes place, one country will have higher abatement costs 
(the seller of permits), the other will have lower costs. However, if a trade is profitable, the 
sum of the pollution control costs will be lower. 
Table 10 displays the impacts on costs at a country level. In calculating the cost 
distribution after trading, we assumed that the countries with reduced control costs will 
compensate for the higher pollution control costs of their trading partner (the permit seller). 
Moreover, in this table a 50150 division of the net cost-savings is assumed. Table 10 shows 
that compared to a uniform percentage reduction, all countries face lower costs under both 
trading schemes. 
Remarkably, some countries will have negative net costs: their pollution control costs 
are lower than the sum of the transfers they receive from the cost savings in other countries. 
This is the case for France and the Baltic region in exchange rate trading, and for FRG-E 
and Byelorussia in one-to-one trading. This effect is caused by the initial distribution: the 
uniform scenario asked for a 84% reduction. As a result, some countries had to carry out 
their maximum feasible reductions and hence were unable to decrease emissions further to 
become permit sellers. Other countries (e.g. France) can decrease emissions beyond the 84% 
level and were thus able to further reduce costs by selling permits. 
It is important to mention that the final distribution of costs after trading can be 
influenced by allocating more permits to economically less developed countries, which can 
then sell permits to reduce costs. In doing so, one has to take care that deposition targets are 
not violated. The fact that for every country costs are lower, or at least equal, after trading 
is however a typical, attractive feature of emission trading. 
6.6 Distribution of environmental benefits 
The regional environmental impacts of emission trading are not immediately clear-cut 
but depend on specific circumstances. One may expect, however, that the chance is higher 
that target loads, initially met, will be exceeded using the exchange rate than with the one- 
to-one case for two reasons: 
- Emission trading subject to exchange rates may increase overall emissions. 
- Emissions are redistributed to a greater extent, so that the final distribution differs 
much more than the pre-trade distribution. 
Starting from extremely low initial emission levels, neither the one-to-one trading nor 
the exchange rate trading violate the target loads in any country. On the one hand, this is due 
to the fact that initial emissions are very low and, on the other, to the fact that the offset 
rates are based on the transfer coefficients of the receptors that are binding in the optimum. 
Hence, to a certain degree the exchange rate takes care of the impact of location on 
deposition. 
Table 11 shows that some countries will experience a higher exceedance of critical 
loads as a result of trading than they would with uniform reduction, whereas others will be 
lower. One-to-one trading results in more negative environmental impacts for Austria, CSFR, 
West-Germany, and Hungary. The results for Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, Yugoslavia and the USSR are indifferent. Other countries gain environmental 
benefits from trading. 
With exchange rate trading, in some countries (Bulgaria, CSFR, France, FRG-W and 
FRG-E, Poland, Sweden and Yugoslavia) the exceedance of critical loads is smaller than with 
uniform reduction. In other countries (Belgium, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Norway and the 
remaining part of the former USSR) a larger area experiences an exceedance of critical loads. 
For all other countries there is no difference. 
It has to be stressed again that in the example presented in this paper, the original 
target loads as submitted by ten countries, were increased by 40% in order to open space for 
emission trading. This reduces the direct relationship between target loads and critical loads. 
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Table 10. Distribution of annual costs (million DMIyr) 
Table 11. Exceedance of critical loads1) (% of land area) 
1) Exceedances are expressed in terms of 5 percentile critical loads, 
except for countries where this percentile results in zero values. In those cases 
the 50% values were used. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Conclusions 
In general, emission trading systems may offer an alternative approach in achieving 
cost-effective implementation of effect-oriented policy targets. Whereas several trading 
options have been proposed to deal with uniformly dispersed pollutants (such as C o d ,  the 
situation is much more complex when considering non-uniformly dispersed pollutants where 
the location of the emission source is of importance (e.g. for SO2), if certain regional 
exposure levels should be maintained. 
Cost-effectiveness implies that a certain environmental objective is achieved at 
minimum cost. If the objective is the attainment of a fixed level of emissions, cost- 
effectiveness requires that marginal costs per ton emission controlled are equalized. If the 
objective is a set of deposition targets, the marginal costs per ton emission abated will 
generally have to be different since they have to reflect the transfer of emission from the 
sources to the receptor areas. 
In theory, trading deposition (or ambient) permits would fulfill the conditions for cost- 
minimal resource allocation. In such a case, a separate market has to be established for every 
receptor area and the polluters have to act on a large number of markets simultaneously. The 
system is expected to be too complex for practical implementation. 
A number of alternative simpler trading schemes have been suggested and partly 
applied in practice: emission trading in one zone, in several zones, trading of deposition 
permits for only one (critical) receptor and trading subject to trading rules with respect to the 
deposition. The first three systems do not guarantee that the deposition targets are met or 
they result in excessive costs. Trading subject to trading rules requires the use of a dispersion 
model to analyze deposition levels before and after each single trade. Although this is a 
guarantee for avoiding "hot spots", the system is complex for the traders and is likely to 
reduce potential cost savings in practice. 





